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ABSTRACT
Since the inception of CubeSats, small companies have risen to the challenge of filling slots in the traditional value
chain for satellite infrastructure to try to support these new, low-cost satellite projects that are popping up
everywhere. Developing new products, services and solutions, these companies may have given traditional upstream
space industry companies a truly disruptive business model. This model, aimed at low cost, non space-qualified
components and systems allows for rapid deployment of space assets at moderate to low cost. In the decade of the
rise of the nanosatellite, particularly the standardized CubeSat, is often heralded as a true disruptor of the space
industry. Milk carton sized satellites at a fraction of the cost of traditional space systems can be bought online
through web shops and online portals. This model may be disruptive with respect to traditional space projects but is
it sustainable for those companies that dedicate themselves to the development and manufacturing of these
standardized space systems? Can space companies be profitable in a low-cost, high value, high risk market segment?
failure of the nanosatellite industrial companies that
provide the various stakeholders with technical
solutions.

INTRODUCTION
For sure, nanosatellites have seen tremendous growth in
terms of amount of spacecraft developed, built and
launched over the past decade, a sort of mini-space race
has evolved around the new nanosatellite niche market
that allowed organizations, rather than nations to
compete head to head. In 2013, about 40% of all
satellites launched where smaller than 5 kilograms.
Many of the parts, components and subsystems of these
nanosatellites have been provided by a handful of space
companies dedicated to the nanosatellite niche market
and provide the standardized, low cost building blocks
such an interesting way of performing space missions.
ISIS – Innovative Solutions In Space BV is a vertically
integrated small satellite company, focused on
providing high value, cost effective space solutions by
making use of the latest innovative technologies. The
company is focused on nanosatellites in the range of 1
to 20 kilograms. As one of Europe’s leaders in the
nanosatellite domain, ISIS offers contract research,
innovative small satellite parts, sub-systems and
platforms as well as turnkey space solutions to a broad
range of customers for small satellite missions and
applications. ISIS supports nanosatellites throughout
their lifecycle and as such is an active player in the
domains of system level testing, launch services and
operations of nanosatellites. Being active in the field of
nanosatellites for over eight years, and having
established itself as a market leader, ISIS is in an
excellent position to critically reflect on the success or
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This paper addresses the nanosatellite market from a
number of different perspectives. First of all it will
provide an overview of the establishment of
nanosatellite companies since the inception of the
CubeSat standard and map the evolution of these
companies against the developments within the
nanosatellite domain. Despite the fact that some large
companies have experimented with nanosatellite
component and the role of nanosatellite integration, this
niche market is mainly the domain of SME’s such as
ISIS, Pumpkin, Gomspace and Clyde-Space.
The paper will assess how well these companies have
done in the years that they are active in the nanosatellite
market based on publicly available company data such
as profitability and order book growth. Becoming
profitable in a low cost market is not very easy and
requires significant economies of scale. The paper will
address whether the sector is mature enough to be able
to recuperate the investments in the sector or not. It will
look into growth and profitability bottlenecks as well as
new opportunities and chances for further growth.
Whether or not industrial nanosatellite space companies
have been able to become profitable in the past years
(and most have not yet been able to do so), the future
holds some promising elements in terms of market
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developments, possible new applications etc., we may
be at the start of a truly innovative way forward for
many different applications.

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE COMMERCIAL
NANOSATELLITE SECTOR
Nanosatellites are a great success and are
revolutionizing the way low cost satellite missions are
being executed faster, better and cheaper. At least, that
is what we tell ourselves in the nanosatellite community
and this disruptive approach is aimed at helping the
transformation of the space business into a more mature
sector of activities. But the small satellite community
needs to be careful not to become a victim of
groupthink. Surely, the old model of the space sector
leaves a lot to be desired, and is in need of a more
modern, and cost-effective approach. And very small
satellites are clearly a new way of doing space missions
and may disrupt the traditional space sector by allowing
space engineers all over the world to look differently at
the
various
value-for-money trade-offs,
risk
assessments and programmatic timelines.

Since the creation of the CubeSat concept at the turn of
the century in order to enable university students to gain
hands-on experience with actual flight projects,
companies have been intensively involved in
nanosatellite development activities and have
established themselves are valuable partners for many
nanosatellite developers. With the CubeSat concept
companies were also enabled to find a different role in
satellite design than their traditional role.
Large systems integrators have dominated the space
industry for a long time, particularly since consolidation
into even larger entities seems the only way to survive
for aerospace and defense conglomerates since the end
of the cold war. Smaller companies are often found in
either highly specialized niches or deep down in the
space industry supply chain. The advance of the
nanosatellite concept allowed small companies to have
a more established role, as subsystem provider or even
system prime.

Nevertheless, an important question is whether the
nanosatellite sector is a viable business altogether. Can
the sector sustain itself, without depending heavily on
government grants and be sufficiently profitable to not
only change the way we do traditional missions by
adopting lessons learned from the nanosatellite field,
but establishing itself as a long term viable niche
market within the space sector.

As a result, small companies have been at the forefront
of the nanosatellite industry. These companies often
have close ties with academic institutes, as many
companies are spin-offs from early nanosatellite
projects. These companies include ISIS, GomSpace,
BST, AxelSpace, Tyvak and many others. In recent
years a lot of university nanosatellite projects have seen
early startups spinning off from these projects. Other
companies have successfully diversified in the
nanosatellite market following early involvement in
projects and have established dedicated product lines or
even largely switched to the nanosatellite market.
Examples include Pumpkin Inc., SSBV, SolarMems,
Sinclair Interplanetery, SpaceQuest and Andrews
Space. Sometimes all it takes is an enthusiastic
individual working in an adjacent field to start a new
company such as ClydeSpace or Lens-R&D.

Nanosatellites offer a faster programme implementation
by much reduced complexity in the spacecraft design,
maximizing reuse of existing products and designs and
a significantly different approach with respect to
scoping the mission. Nanosatellites are sort of limited in
their capability by definition, and as a result they
impose significant constraints on the payloads that can
be accommodated. There is only so much performance
one can implement in a 10 kilogram spacecraft. This
leads to mission design approach for single satellite
missions that are mainly driven by constraints, rather
than requirements. This keeps the scope of the mission
limited, and as a result the mission can quickly be
implemented. This has a direct impact on companies
involved in this sector as well, as customers expect the
delivery of hardware and software solutions in record
time.

Semi-Academic or governmental entities that are
commercially active are also a characteristic of this
market, where entities such as Calpoly and UTIAS SFL
operate side-by-side with entrepreneurial companies.
Larger companies are making strides into the
nanosatellite domain from time to time, but almost
always as a project leader for a governmental mission
of programme or as a supporting entity to a university
project. Very few large companies have a dedicated
nanosatellite product line. For the remainder of this
paper, the focus lies on the specific nanosatellite
industry; entities that develop, build and sell hardware,
software and services to the nanosatellite market.
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Using multiple nanosatellites can break these mission
constraints on using nanosatellites by distributed
architectures and focusing on different system drivers
compared to more traditional systems. As an example
one can think of revisit times versus ground sampling
resolution. A more traditional system can provide
superior ground sampling resolution over a single
nanosatellite, but a network of those nanosatellites can
greatly outperform coverage, data latency and revisit
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as the organization is more flexible in changing the
focus area slightly.

times within a similar budget. So different space
systems can address different customer requirements
better than others, where nanosatellites have something
to offer as well.

MAKING MONEY IN A LOW COST MARKET
At their record-low costs, student groups can build a
satellite and get the funding together for a launch and in
recent times a number of crowdfunding projects
managed to raise sufficient funds from a large number
of individuals to build a crowd-funded nanosatellite.
Surely, the new cost model for nanosatellites, is a
disruptive force in the space sector. Large scale projects
can learn valuable lessons from the fast-paced, ultracheap missions that can be deployed in less than a year
to be more nimble and cost-effective in other projects.
However, how are companies going to make money in
a market that has championed the idea that the space
industry is too expensive, and students can build their
own hardware? A company has a number of options on
how to participate in the nanosatellite market. Many
specialize in particular component, subsystem or
service and offer that to the entire nanosatellite sector.
Others find a role as a system integrator and offer
turnkey solutions. Both approaches have their
advantages and disadvantages.

It is not easy to make money in the space business but
in the low-cost corner of the space market it is even
harder to do so. The low-cost nanosatellite market touts
advantages for using commercial or industrial grade
components and processes, hinting at the recurring
production efficiencies of consumer electronics
production that are now also in reach of standardized
nanosatellite component and subsystem manufacturing.
Even though the volumes in nanosatellite production
are often higher than in traditional space activities, the
volumes are tiny compared to most terrestrial
production activities such as electronics, and this causes
a number of pitfalls for turning new nanosatellite
product lines into profitable activities.
Profits on sales are required to fuel internal
development, invest in new capabilities, grow the
capacity of the company etc., or to provide a return on
investment for those entities that put money on the table
before the company was profitable to achieve the same
goals. So how easy is it to make some profit on a new
product for the nanosatellite market? It turns out that
that is not very easy. Products need to be designed and
developed by engineers, prototypes and qualification
models need to be built and tested before a product can
be delivered to customers, this all costs money that
needs to be recuperated from the sales of the product.
As the volumes are relatively low, the component of
non-recurring engineering costs in the overall cost
structure of a nanosatellite product is maybe low
compared to a traditional space product, it is rather high
when comparing this to an industrial electronics or
consumer product.

Being highly focused on a particular element in the
nanosatellite value chain or on a specific component
allows a company to focus its resources to one
particular area. This focused approach means that in
general the development cycles are shorter and the
company can achieve a market-ready product with
relatively low investments and with a small and
compact team. However, such an approach does limit
your ability to respond to opportunities outside your
particular focus area and makes you vulnerable to direct
competitors, etc. Such companies will have to achieve a
dominant role in their particular field to sustain their
business in the long run as they would require large
volumes of sales for their particular item and would
need to ensure sufficient sales to maintain their position
year upon year.

Another surprising driver for costs when using nonspace components in product designs for nanosatellites
is part obsolescence. Design cycles in industrial or
commercial grade electronics are now so short that
parts may become obsolete before the product has even
been flown in space. This may lead to a necessity to
continuously update designs and requalify the product
when obsolete parts are replaced, or it may lead to the
need to stockpile large amounts of parts at a point when
product success is not yet guaranteed. Particularly in
low data rate radio products for nanosatellite are often
faced with obsolete components, and component cost
may go up with orders of magnitudes once foundries
stop producing certain components. This often leads to
a combination of stocking key components and

Opting for a turn-key, nano-prime approach is a
different approach all together. Such an approach
requires a larger, multi-disciplinary team, more
facilities, a broad (and expensive) palette of design
tools, etc. in order to be able to offer a full complement
of products and services. Of course certain specific
parts and components can be procured from the
specialist companies, provided that they exist, which is
not always the case in this young market segment, but it
also necessitates the need for the companies to have
some knowledge in-house of every satellite segment
and subsystem. The upside is that the company can
much more easily respond to threats and opportunities
Rotteveel
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mission configuration after PDR to replace a baseline
component with a new, less proven alternative. Giving
preference to heritage systems and components may be
a sound risk-mitigation strategy, it also makes the
introduction of innovative new products so complex
and time consuming that the products are effectively
outdated when they hit the market. Luckily the
nanosatellite market is a bit less conservative and is
able to accept a bit more risk when the use of a new
system can result in an edge over legacy systems, or
even enable new functionality all together. However,
market introduction is still a lengthy process. A
nanosatellite mission design and development activity
may take anywhere from 9 months to 4 years and if you
miss the window of opportunity and your new system is
not baselined on time, it will not fly until a possible
follow-on mission. Even if you are selected in the
baseline of a mission it will often take some time before
the parts are actually ordered.

upgrading design to become less dependent on these
obsolete parts.
In addition, these products need to be produced. And
given the fact that even in the high-volume nanosatellite
market companies typically make no more than several
tens of units at a time, the recurring costs for
nanosatellite products are rather high compared to real
mass-production such as computers or smart-phones, or
even medical equipment. Finding a supply chain that is
outfitted to supply small volume of high-tech parts and
components can be quite a challenge for companies and
often it is decided to keep production in-house,
resulting in additional investments in production
facilities, tools and training of staff and building up
stock of components and semi-finished products
(particularly those previously mentioned obsolete
parts).
The cost advantage of commercial grade or industrial
grade components is partly vested in the fact that the
parts are used in bulk in numerous products and are
therefore very cost-effective. However, this often
means that nanosatellite part manufacturers are faced
with minimum order quantities (MOQs) for key parts
that are much higher than initial sales projections justify
leading to additional investments in unused parts.
Numerous examples are available to highlight this
aspect. For example, for outsourcing electronics board
manufacturing, parts often need to be order on a tapereel for automated pick & place processes and
nanosatellite producers are sometimes faced to buy full
reels with hundreds or thousands of components when
the projected need per year is lower than 25 units.
Another key point is special materials, alloys, etc. that
need to be specifically made for a customer and almost
always have a MOQ associated with it. ISIS’
deployable antenna system makes use of a special alloy
for the antenna elements and a reel of antenna material
of this alloy could only be produced using a certain
minimum amount of alloy. This resulted in a few
kilometers of antenna material delivered for the
prototype testing of the deployable antenna (requiring
only 2 meters for the prototype), with lots of risk of
never recuperating the initial purchase of the rest of the
material and having to pre-finance five production
years’ worth of antenna element material prior to
having a final design.

This element is something that the nanosatellite sector
has cultivated a bit of course. The idea of off-the-shelf
components is that you can order them very late in your
design process as they are standard parts and should
have a short lead time. In reality many nanosatellite
parts are still build to order or need customer specific
options implemented using semi-finished stock. This
means that there is quite some pressure on nanosatellite
part suppliers to deliver fast and get customer order
late, which may necessitate a lot of rush production
jobs, often implemented at premium cost.
Staying in constant contact with potential customers is
key to be able to predict future sales volumes, build up
adequate stocks and actually making a sale at the end of
typically long acquisition paths that can easily take 12 –
24 months. Sales costs typically reflect this, as
companies have to promote their products at
conferences, exhibits, online and face-to-face often and
repeatedly and should basically start before the product
is ready and proven otherwise the sales pick up too
slow and the breakeven point lies too far into the future.
Although there is increasing competition between
nanosatellite companies for contracts to supply parts
and components, the main fight for market share of
components, subsystems, full solutions or services for
nanosatellite projects is a make-or-buy decision by the
customer. Despite growing numbers of commercial and
agency missions, a large fraction of nanosatellites is
still being performed by academic groups and research
institutes. These groups often have the benefit of
perceived free labor in terms of students and staff for
which virtually no labor costs are charged to the
project. This often leads to skewed trade-offs where
buying in systems or solutions is perceived as

In the space sector acquisition times are typically long.
Bringing a new product to the market you need to have
a certain technology readiness level before being
considered a viable candidate for a mission and due to
the relatively long project durations, timing of your
market introduction can be a key element in getting
early sales as it is typically hard to break open a space
Rotteveel
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expensive. Despite the fact that companies have
designed their product in such a way that they can
write-off their R&D expenses over several tens of
missions they can support, may have lots of heritage
and offer very low schedule risk, the academic
customers remain divided between making their own
systems and buying them form an established supplier.
However, if implementation speed is required, it makes
sense to rely on companies to be able to quickly provide
systems. These systems also have well defined
(although not always optimal) interfaces to which teams
can start to design right from the start. Nanosatellite
companies have proven to be quite good at coming up
with products and services that are compatible with the
majority of the academic nanosatellite needs, at a very
low cost.

good alternative to existing nanosatellite products
commonly found in the majority of nanosatellite
spacecraft. A small team of 2 engineers can design and
build the product prototype in 12 months, and while the
product is being tested and qualified the marketing team
already starts promoting this new product to generate
interest and to try to receive orders quickly after
successful ground qualification in month 18. ACME
NanoSat Company expects to sell up to 20 units to early
adopters in the market in the first 18 months and once
the unit has successfully flown in space sales will pick
up to 30 units per year, building up a market share of
about 20-25% in year 2 after market introduction. This
is achieved by a very proactive international marketing
campaign and a very sharp price, at 10% below the
competitor’s for a retail price of 7,500 USD .

On the other side of the spectrum are the commercial
endeavors, often venture capital backed, that focus on
deploying large numbers of satellites in a highly
accelerated pace, where the maximum performance
needs to be packed into the smallest possible
nanosatellite. This often calls for highly customized
form-factors, interfaces, etc. Something most
nanosatellite product providers do not offer without
additional costs for customization as the part providers
can only offer low cost products by offering largely
identical systems. As these commercial constellations
often consist out of several tens of satellites, it is
difficult for part providers to compete with the
commercial customers themselves. Firstly the high
customization fees, are quite comparable to the internal
development costs of the commercial companies.
Secondly, buying 20 – 30 units from a supplier would
give the buyer a significant bargaining position to buy
the systems with a significant discount. The former
aspect makes is less attractive for the buyer to outsource
its highly customized design as it loses control over its
development schedule and will have to establish a
supply-chain management role. The latter aspect (huge
discounts upon bulk-purchases), makes bidding on such
contracts less attractive to the component providers,
who need a healthy profit margin to recuperate
previously made development costs (see later on).

Selling 30 units a year results in revenues of 225,000
USD annually and in the long run it is assumed that the
recurring production cost will be roughly 50% of the
sales price, including an overhead factor for indirect
costs. Taking into account direct costs for marketing
and sales of some 25,000 USD annually this product
line will result in a profit of about 87,500 USD per year,
or 39%. At first glance this seems like a good business
case, but clearly the non-recurring engineering needs to
be taken into account, as well as the cost of capital.
Selling 100 units in 5 years after the first prototype is
quite decent for introducing a new nanosatellite product
to a myriad of customers. However, the at the start of
the product launch it is still unsure on how successful
the product will be in the market, and the nanosatellite
product market is small and young, making comparison
material very scarce. Writing off the NRE in 5 years
time is assumed to be quite adequate for this market.
After such a period of time and feedback from
customers, a major revision is often required anyway.
In addition, capital often does not come for free.
Whether the development funds are coming from a
bank loan or a loan from informals or whether
professional investors have taken a stake in your
company to enable this new product, everyone wants
and needs to be compensated for the risk they take by
putting money in your business plan. Even if this new
product case can be funded from cash flows the
company is generating through the provisions of other
product sales or the rendering of services, the company
management will expect some return on their own
investment and will perform a trade-off between the
various projects they can fund.

EXAMPLE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT CASE
FOR NANOSATELLITES
If we do a thought experiment for a hypothetical, but
typical nanosatellite product, these various aspects can
be used to give some idea of the profitability of a
particular nanosatellite line. Several assumptions are
made in this example, but are found to be quite in line
with typical development projects.

If we put all of this in a small overview it will soon be
clear that it is not that easy to be hugely profitable with
the given assumptions. The table below shows the
example case in an overview taking into account the net

Suppose the ACME NanoSat Company decides to start
a new product line, the nanoWidget, which provides a
Rotteveel
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present value (NPV) of the cash flows involved. This
means that the cash flows generated in the future are
discounted using a certain discount factor, an indication
of the expected return on capital of whoever puts the
money on the table for this product case. This process
compounds over time, so the further from the start of
the calculation period, the more the resulting cash flows
are discounted. The NPV calculation discounts all
required and resulting cash flows and provides an
indication as to how good this investment is. A negative
total cash flow at the end of the period means that this
is not a good investment case. Also, the higher the total
cash flow and the end of the period, the better the
investment case compared to other, lower cash flow,
cases. As a start, let’s assume a bank loan is provided
for the development sum and that this results in a
discount rate of 10%.

Therefore, a purely commercial approach to the
development of nanosatellite products does not really
work out well as the market does not allow for
sufficient volume to reduce the NRE to a low enough
fraction of the overall product cost. Also, as the space
market is conservative and tends to rely on heritage
products, this means that revenue growth is slow in
general and that means that in an NPV calculation a
business case is unattractive due to the fact that profits
come too late. Even in the fast(er) acting nanosatellite
market, it takes often 2-3 years after a market
introduction that a product is sold in sufficient volumes
to sustain the product line on its own.
These aspects are often counteracted by means of
financial support in the R&D phase, by means of
subsidies, government grants or launching customer
contracts. This is quite common for the space business
in general and the nanosatellite market profits from
such incentives. This helps keeping the early stage
expenses in line and thus greatly improving the NPV
and RoI calculations for the product case. Although
nanosatellite developments are not yet fully embedded
in most government space technology programmes,
with the sole exception of a few dedicated programmes,
it is nevertheless often possible to achieve some level of
co-funding for the technology development phase. If we
update the calculations with a 35% subsidy of the
development costs, all of a sudden the product has a
viable future. As can be seen below, the NPV
calculation now shows a positive total cash flow and the
RoI greatly improves.

Table 1: NanoWidget NPV - basic assumptions

Let’s have a look at this overview as this does not look
so great. Despite the fact that the product sales yield a
39% gross profit in year 3, 4, and 5, the overall return
on investment (RoI) is only 1,23 after five years.
Possibly there is some additional value if the business
would be liquidated and inventories, intellectual
property, etc. is sold, but as a profit center, this
nanosatellite product is not the most appealing product
ever. What is worse, the NPV calculation shows that the
product case does not have a positive total cash flow
and as a result it should not be pursued!

Table 2: NanoWidget NPV – with subsidies

How is it possible that such a straight forward
investment case with a good gross profit, is not
interesting to pursue? And why do so many companies
that provide nanosatellite components still invest in new
products. A key element that is typical for the space
industry is that the non-recurring engineering for a
space product is a major component in the cost
structure. This is among others due to the fact that these
products are highly complex and need to operate in an
extreme environment so the overall development costs
are high. On the other hand, the market is limited, even
in the current nanosatellite boom, and achieving sales of
more than a few hundred of identical units is an
exception rather than a rule.
Rotteveel

Being able to receive some subsidies or grants will
make a product case viable. However there is one big
caveat, the case still hinges on the fact that the
remaining investment amount, some 140,000 USD, is to
be provided at affordable rates (e.g. a bank loan, or
company generated cash flows with modest return
targets). If this is not available and the company needs
to raise capital from angel investors or VC’s, the picture
changes quite dramatically and the discount rate will
increase significantly. Typical VC discount rates for
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these kinds of calculations range between 30% and
70%. Taking into account that the space business is not
a hugely scalable market, but also carries much lower
risk compared to internet start-ups, let us assume a
discount rate of 30% if the company needs to raise risk
bearing capital for the product case and see what that
does.

may just not be possible to achieve such a dominant
market share this fast with a risk that despite the
additional investments in marketing and sales, expected
maximum revenues stay much lower and such an
aggressive campaign is not possible.
If that is the case, the alternative is to try to find a way
to lower the initial expenses for the R&D in order to
improve the returns without such an aggressive
marketing approach. Depending on where the company
is incorporated, and thus which tax incentives,
government subsidies and grants may be available to
the company, it is even very much possible to achieve
much better RoIs at half the revenue and without the
need to raise capital as shown below, with a subsidy
rate of 70% and a very small bank loan for the
remaining 30% a RoI of 4.25 can be achieved.

Table 3: NanoWidget NPV – Venture Capital

Table 5: NanoWidget NPV – Maximized Subsidy
As can be seen, the RoI does not change, but the NPV
calculation is now negative, effectively meaning that
this business case will not receive its required funding.
So in order to make this business case work, either the
subsidies and grants need to cover all development
costs (something that is less and less likely as publicprivate-partnerships are all the rage for space
technology developments), or the business case need to
be adjusted to align better to the investors’ expectations.
Starting with the latter, investors look for a faster and
more scalable business, and typically accept a bit more
risk in return. Therefore, a logical approach is to take a
more aggressive marketing and sales approach for your
product and aim at a much larger market share buy
more advertising, more trade-shows, etc. Let’s assume
that this is feasible and that by ramping up the
marketing and sales cost in such a way that the number
of units sold doubles over the 5 year period, bringing
the market share to 45-50%.

This example shows that it is very possible to establish
a successful product line in the nanosatellite field but
that this is not very straightforward. The limited size of
the market, and the slow market penetration is making
this market a tough one to be successful in. Therefore, it
is quite impressive to see so many small companies
succeed in introducing new products and sustaining
sales year after year.
HOW ARE EXISTING NANOSATELLITE
COMPANIES PERFORMING?

Table 4: NanoWidget NPV – Aggressive Marketing

This example product case holds in general for the
development of nanosatellite companies as well. It is
difficult to become profitable very fast due to the slow
rate of market adoption and the very limited size of the
market. Looking to a number of European nanosatellite
companies and their profitability over the past years this
becomes quite apparent.
ISIS, ClydeSpace and GomSpace are the dominant
nanosatellite companies in Europe and due to their
international sales are leaders in the global nanosatellite
world. However, when looking at profitability of these
companies over the growth years of the nanosatellite
domain, it shows that these companies have been
struggling to capitalize on the growth of the

This results in a feasible investment case with a
discount rate of 30% and yielding a RoI of 3.43 which
is quite respectable for the space business. However, it
Rotteveel
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nanosatellite sector. Using data from financial
statements deposited by the companies in the databases
of their respective chambers’ of commerce, it shows
that on average these successful companies have
accumulated losses rather than profits. In the period
2005 – 2013 these three companies combined have
accumulated about 1,000,000 USD in losses, which are
partially offset by raising a total amount north of
1,500,000 USD in investments or startup capital.
Profitability seems to be returning to these companies
but they have to compensate previous losses, before the
investments in these faster, better, cheaper space
companies are going to pay off.

The growth of the venture-backed commercial
constellations may offer the largest opportunities for the
system integrator companies, where framework
contracts to series-produce identical satellites may lay
in waiting, when the commercial customers focus more
on their core activities of providing a revolutionary
service and less on the enabling, underlying
technologies (networks of small satellites).
For the nanosatellite sector, we may well be in the
middle of an explosive development boom that will be
followed by a period of consolidation and further
specialization as has happened in the automotive and
aeronautics sector after the first decades of pioneering
has led to widespread establishment of small
companies.
CONCLUSIONS
In short it can be stated that the long-term financial
success of companies providing products and services
into the nanosatellite sector still needs to be proven in
the coming years. All the signs are there that the various
suppliers are positioned to profit from the investments
in technology they have made in the past decade, but
new entrants and increased bargaining power of large
customers may put long term profitability under
pressure, just at the moment that the initial investments
are being recovered. The first decade of CubeSats may
have disrupted the low earth orbiting satellite market in
terms of time to market and offers the lowest possible
cost for early proof of concept and pre-operational
services, whether the companies operating in this niche
will be able to succeed remains uncertain.

Figure 1: Nanosat company profitability
The above figure shows that 2011 in particular was a
tough year for the nanosatellite companies investigated.
This can be partially be attributed to the fact that these
companies all invested in their own satellite
development, largely funded through private funds, a
costly and risky endeavor, which will hopefully pay off
in the coming years.
The growth of the nanosatellite sector in the past couple
of years offers promise for the industrial players, but
some words of warning are appropriate here. As many
start-up companies in this domain have been founded as
a spin-off from a specific nanosatellite project or
programme, the uptake in nanosatellite missions (in
particular from the academic projects) is expected to
result in a number of new entrants in the market that
will compete with the established players. Focused
startups with low overheads may have a significant
cost-advantage over incumbent competitors that have
established a significant market share.

In the recent years, nanosatellites have proven to have
their utility, that there is a real need for them in the
overall product mix of space assets, and that there are
specific areas that nanosatellites are more suited to
address than others when it comes to cost-effectiveness.
However, the question that now begs an answer is not,
‘what can you do with a nanosatellite? , but rather ‘Is
that activity sustainable’. This paper has outlined a
number of aspects that make this a challenging
endeavor.
Profits have been slim at best, and in that respect the
companies building nanosatellite systems show no real
difference from more established providers of hardware
in the space domain, it is not easy making a profit in the
upstream space market if volumes remains low, and
customers are likely to opt for custom implementations
rather than relying on the standard products that the
companies provide.

How this will all pan-out in the long-term remains to be
seen but it can be expected that the most cost-minded
customers (university and student groups) will switch to
the new entrants, while the more traditional
stakeholders (agencies and research institutes) will be
willing to stay with established, experienced suppliers
with heritage systems. Companies will have to deal
with this dynamic in the nanosatellite world and choose
which market to pursue or risk being stuck in the
middle.

Rotteveel
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solutions is most-likely a requirement for the long term
success of the industrial players in this niche market. It
is unsustainable to have so many startup companies and
academic project teams to use unproven systems at
bare-minimum rates, while having to adhere to
increasing levels of compliancy with codes-of-conduct,
legislation, etc. The advent of more stringent national
space laws and even the mandatory insurance of space
assets for third party liability will hopefully steer a
larger number of customers to relying on series
produced, heritage systems to reduce to overall risk and
thus costs in the face of increasing costs of launch and
operations.
It is also believed that it will prove to be unsustainable
for new application providers to build all their
nanosatellite hardware themselves, as this spreads their
attention too thin, and that nano-primes will be able to
win production contract for nanosatellite constellations
as a build-to-print activity, something that will helps
tremendously to write off investments in facilities and
tools at an accelerated rate.
Despite the huge success of nanosatellite as a space
market disruptor, it has proven to be hard to reap the
rewards of this momentous change in how you can
pursue low earth orbit space activities. Nevertheless, the
future looks bright for a consolidated group of
industrial nanosatellite companies.

Rotteveel
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